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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The police detained Natalie Miramontes while they conducted a residence check on a
female probationer.

During the detention, an officer asked Ms. Miramontes for her

identification. Ms. Miramontes said it was in her purse, but when she tried to go get the purse,
she was stopped by the officer, and she was not permitted to retrieve the purse. Ms. Miramontes
described her purse as a floral, patterned bag. When an officer opened one of the three cosmetic
bags he had located amongst the things Ms. Miramontes dropped in the yard, a bag printed with
palm trees, he saw baggies, syringes, and a crystalline substance that tested presumptively
positive for methamphetamine.

The other purses/bags were searched, and additional drug

paraphernalia was located. Ms. Miramontes also identified the room in the home where she had
slept, and a search of that room yielded a syringe and a container that held suspected
methamphetamine. Ms. Miramontes moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of her
detention and the search of her purse(s). The district court denied her motion, and
Ms. Miramontes entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to appeal the district
court’s denial of her motion. On appeal, Ms. Miramontes contends the district court erred by
denying her motion where her purse was searched absent reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal wrongdoing, and the probationer’s Fourth Amendment waiver did not make lawful the
search of Ms. Miramontes’s purse. The evidence found in the purses and the during the
subsequent search of the room in which Ms. Miramontes had stayed should have been
suppressed as the fruits of an unlawful search, and this Court should reverse the district court’s
order.
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This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s fallacious claim that
Ms. Miramontes’s “argument that the district court erred because the search of her purse was
illegal is not preserved for appeal.” (Resp. Br., p.13.) Ms. Miramontes also addresses the State’s
contention that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because the evidence would have inevitably
been discovered.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Miramontes articulated the relevant facts and proceedings in the Appellant’s Brief.
They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Miramontes’s motion to suppress?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Miramontes’s Motion To Suppress
A.

The State’s Argument Regarding Issue Preservation Fails, Because Ms. Miramontes
Asserted That The Purse With The Palm Trees Was Searched Absent A Warrant And
Absent Consent, And She Sought Suppression Of The Evidence Obtained From The
Unlawful Searches Of Her Purses And The Bedroom In Which She Was Staying
The State asserts the Ms. Miramontes did not argue to the trial court that her purse with

the palm trees was unlawfully searched, thus, the issue is unpreserved for appellate review.
(Resp. Br., pp.6-13.) The State makes this argument despite citing, in its statement of facts
(Resp. Br., p.3), the fact that another hearing was scheduled by the court in which the court asked
for clarification from the prosecutor as to where the methamphetamine was located that it was
prosecuting Ms. Miramontes for possessing.

(2/25/19 Tr., p.6, L.24 – p.11, L.24.)

The

prosecutor represented to the district court that it had charged Ms. Miramontes with possessing
both the methamphetamine in the purse, and the methamphetamine found in the search of the
room in which Ms. Miramontes was staying. (2/25/19 Tr., p.11, L.25 – p.12, L.2.) Thereafter,
defense counsel agreed that the officers could probably have detained Ms. Miramontes to
determine her identity because she was present during the search. (2/25/19 Tr., p.13, L.24 –
p.14, L.1.)
However, counsel argued that Ms. Miramontes did not consent to the search. (2/25/19
Tr., p.14, Ls.13-23.) Defense counsel asserted that Ms. Miramontes’s purse was not found in
plain view, where she was prevented from going to retrieve the purse by an officer. (2/25/19
Tr., p.14, Ls.4-23.) Defense counsel asserted that “[the State] searched without a warrant and
without consent.” (2/25/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-5.) To each of these statements, the district court
affirmatively stated its understanding of the defense’s arguments. (2/25/19 Tr., p.14, L.1 – p.15,
L.13.) Thus, defense counsel argued that the search of Ms. Miramontes’s belongings was absent
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a warrant, and then eliminated several other exceptions to the warrant requirement by which the
State would predictably seek to justify the warrantless search. (2/25/19 Tr., p.14, L.13 – p.15,
L.5.) Defense counsel was not required to do more than that to preserve the issue for appeal.
See State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 100 (2019) (addressing issue preservation and holding “it
would be inappropriate for this Court to rule that the district court erred by not considering
evidence or argument not presented to it.”)
“A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause, is
presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “When a warrantless
search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.” Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829,
833 (2002).

Generally, evidence obtained from the result of an unlawful search must be

excluded. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004). “The exclusionary rule requires the
suppression of both ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure’
and, pertinent here, ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality,’ the
proverbial ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720 (2017) (quoting
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)).
At the conclusion of the hearing to clarify the suppression issues, the district court said,
The question is that even if I were to suppress the drugs they found in the purse,
does that -- is the discovery of the drugs in the bedroom, which everybody
acknowledge -- appeared to acknowledge that she was staying in sufficiently
attenuated . . . from the discovery of the drugs in the purse so as to be a proper
basis for these charges, regardless of what was in the purse? And you’re saying
it’s fruit of the poisonous tree.
(2/25/19 Tr., p.16, L.24 – p.17, L.9.) Thus, the court recognized that Ms. Miramontes was
perhaps seeking exclusion of the methamphetamine as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (2/25/19
Tr., p.17, Ls.22-24.) Thereafter, defense counsel submitted supplemental briefing in which
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counsel argued, “It is Ms. Miramontes’ position that the evidence obtained from Officer
LaValee’s search of the pink/salmon bag was the product of an illegal search, which was the
conclusion of Ms. Miramontes’ first Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress.

It is also

Ms. Miramontes’ position that evidence obtained (physical evidence and statements) subsequent
to the police search and investigation of Christine Evan[s]’s residence, as applied to
Ms. Miramontes, should be suppressed based on the exclusionary rule and as fruit of the
poisonous tree.” (R., p.102.) Defense counsel cited State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26 (2017) and
State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717 (2017), (amongst other cases) in support of its contention.
(R., pp.102-03.)
Thus, the issue of suppression of the evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search
or unlawful searches was before the district court. For the State to argue on appeal that defense
counsel never asserted that the search of the purse was unlawful—where the district court held a
hearing centered around that very argument and additional briefing was submitted to address this
question—is preposterous. (See generally, 2/25/19 Tr.; R., pp.102-32.) Contrary to the State’s
argument (Resp. Br., pp.11-13), the defense does not have to argue more than that to preserve the
issue for appellate review. However, defense counsel did argue more.
In its briefing to the district court, defense counsel’s first argument provided,
It is the defense’s position that the probation officers detained and searched
Ms. Miramontes beyond what should have been allowable under the balancing
test required in State v. Williams, 162 Idaho 56 ([Ct. App.] 2016), thus violating
the Fourth Amendment and requiring suppression of all evidence as fruit of the
unreasonable search and seizure.
(R., p.75.) In yet another instance, defense counsel asked the court to,
[M]ake specific factual findings based on its record and analyze such findings
using the State v. Williams factors to determine whether officers’ intrusion of
Ms. Miramontes’ Fourth Amendment right by detaining and searching her
property was constitutionally permissible.
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(R., p.77.) Throughout its briefing to the district court, the defense argued that the officers
“retrieved” and “searched Ms. Miramontes’ property without consent or a warrant” and asked the
court to “find that the intrusion was constitutionally impermissible.” (R., p.81.) It is apparent
from all of defense counsel’s briefing, as well as the arguments made directly to the district court
on February 25, 2019, that counsel for Ms. Miramontes asserted that she was unlawfully seized
and the search of her purse and of the property in the room in which she was staying was
unconstitutional.
Additionally, in briefing the issues, defense counsel relied upon Idaho decisions which
addressed the suppression of evidence that was the fruit of an unlawful search. See State v.
Williams, 162 Idaho 56 (Ct. App. 2016). Defense counsel discussed at length a case analyzed by
the Williams Court, State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). Valdez was a case
on point with the facts of this case where, “the Utah Court of Appeals ruled the simple detention
to be permissible; however, the subsequent identification and search was not permissible and that
court suppressed the contraband found on Mr. Valdez.” (R., p.80 (citing Williams, 162 Idaho at
62).) Although, in Williams, the Court noted that the Valdez Court determined the detention of
Mr. Valdez was necessary for the officer to exercise control of the situation,
. . . [T]he court went on to note Valdez’s seizure was limited to the reason
justifying it—controlling the scene. As controlling the scene did not require any
investigation into Valdez's identity, the officer’s request for identification
exceeded the scope of the reason justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily
expanded both the duration and scope of the initial detention. As a result, the
evidence obtained following the unreasonable expansion was correctly
suppressed.
Williams, 162 Idaho at 62-63 (internal citations omitted).
In his briefing, defense counsel asked the district court to rule similarly to the Valdez
Court and recognize that the officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion that
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Ms. Miramontes was committing or attempting to commit a crime, and to find “the initial seizure
was constitutionally valid, although the subsequent search was not.” (R., p.81 (quoting Valdez,
62 P.3d at 1059).) Ms. Miramontes asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion
to suppress because her purse with the palm trees was searched, absent reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Further, the probationer’s Fourth Amendment
waiver did not authorize the search of Ms. Miramontes’s purses or the room in which she slept.

B.

Inevitable Discovery Does Not Apply Under These Facts And Circumstances
The State’s asserted exception to the exclusionary rule, inevitable discovery (Resp.

Br., pp.13-15), is inapplicable to this case as it is controverted by the facts of this case and the
Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Garnett, 165 Idaho 845 (2019). The State claimed
that the evidence in Ms. Miramontes’s bedroom “would have been inevitably discovered by the
probation officers during the residence check regardless of Miramontes’s seizure of the search of
her purse.” (Resp. Br., p.15.) However, consent is the applicable exception to the warrant
requirement for the search of a probationer’s home and their property as a condition of probation.
State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345 (2011). “The burden is on the State to show that the
consent exception applies.” Id. 151 Idaho at 346. Where the basis for the search of Ms. Evans’s
home was her consent to waive her rights to be free from governmental searches, the officer
would have needed to possess “reasonable suspicion” that Ms. Evans owned or controlled or
possessed Ms. Miramontes’s purse and the belongings in her bedroom in order to lawfully search
there. See State v. Garnett, 165 Idaho 845, 841 (2019). Because the officers were aware that the
purse with the palm trees and the items found in the room she was staying belonged to
Ms. Miramontes, this standard would not have been met.
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The evidence in question was recovered as a result of the exploitation of the illegal search
of the purses and the room in which Ms. Miramontes was staying—the State cannot prove that
the evidence would have been obtained even if the police illegality was removed from the
equation. See State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 909 (2019) (holding State failed to meet its burden
to show the evidence would have inevitably been discovered). The record is contrary to the
State’s claims that the search of Ms. Miramontes’s purses and the room Ms. Miramontes had
been occupying would have been searched by the officers. (Resp. Br., pp.13-15; R., p.127.)
Officer Myler testified that she was there to perform a routine residence check on Ms. Evans.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-13.) Typically, these residence checks involve “visual contact, a small
overlook of the house. We make sure that there’s no alcohol in the fridge, that the place is in
order. That’s basically it.” (11/27/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-14.) Officer Myler testified that she did not
think there was a problem with Ms. Evans’s probation—the residence check was standard policy.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-20.) Upon seeing the drug-related items in the purse, Officer Myler
called the police department. (11/27/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-10.) Officer Myler did not testify that
she intended to search the residence before seeing the drug-related items in Ms. Miramontes’s
purse. (See 11/27/18 Tr., p.5, L.8 – p.54, L.4.)
Prior to the search of Ms. Miramontes’s purse, the officers were aware that there were
three bedrooms in the house, with one being used by Ms. Miramontes. (11/27/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.28; p.33, Ls.5-19.)

Thus, after the purse was opened and drug-related items identified,

Ms. Miramontes’s other purses and the room where Ms. Miramontes slept were searched with
the understanding that the officers were searching Ms. Miramontes’s belongings—there was no
evidence or argument that either officer believed the items they were searching were owned by
Ms. Evans or were in a common area. Nor was there evidence or argument that the officers
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reasonably believed at the time of the search that Ms. Evans was in control of the purses or the
area in which Ms. Miramontes had been sleeping. See Downing, 163 Idaho at 32 (holding the
doctrine of inevitable discovery “must presuppose inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to
the illegal actions, not in series flowing directly from the officers’ unlawful conduct”). The State
failed to meet its burden of proving the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule.
The officers would not have inevitably discovered the methamphetamine, because they did not
possess “reasonable suspicion” that Ms. Evans owned or controlled or possessed
Ms. Miramontes’s purse and the belongings in her bedroom, such that a search of these items and
this location would have been lawful. See Garnett, 165 Idaho at 841.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Miramontes respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
denying her motion to suppress, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of June, 2021.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of June, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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